Logical Positism And The Vienna Circle Essay free essay sample

, Research Paper Moritz Schlick and A.J. Ayer were both logical rationalists, and members of the Vienna Circle. They had differing yet homocentric positions on the foundations of cognition, and they both shared the quest for truth and certainty. Moritz Schlick believed the all of import efforts at set uping a theory of cognition grow out of the uncertainty of the certainty of human cognition. This job originates in the want for absolute certainty. A really of import thought is the construct of # 8220 ; protocol statements # 8221 ; , which are # 8220 ; # 8230 ; statements which express the facts with absolute simpleness, without any molding, change, or add-on, in whose amplification every scientific discipline consists, and which precede all knowing, every judgement sing the world. # 8221 ; ( 1 ) It makes no sense to talk of unsure facts, merely averments and our cognition can be unsure. If we win hence in showing the natural facts in protocol statements without any taint, these appear to be the perfectly beyond doubt get downing points of all cognition. They are once more abandoned, but they constitute a steadfast footing # 8220 ; # 8230 ; to which all our knowledges owe whatever cogency they may possess. # 8221 ; ( 2 ) Mathematics is stated indirectly into protocol statements which are resolved into definite protocol statements which one could explicate precisely, in rule, but with enormous attempt. Knowledge in life and scientific discipline in some sense begins with verification of facts, and the protocol statements stand at the beginning of scientific discipline. In the event that protocol statements would be distinguished by definite logical belongingss, construction, place in the system of scientific discipline, and one would be confronted with the undertaking of really stipulating these belongingss. We find many expoundings which seem to presuppose that through the method of protocol statements, merely those averments are understood that temporally precede the other averments of scientific discipline. This is a affair of the ultimate footing of cognition of world, and it is non sufficient to handle statements of # 8220 ; ideal buildings # 8221 ; ( in a Platonic manner ) but one must concern oneself with existent happenings, with events that take topographic point in clip, and in which the devising of judgements consists, hence with psychic Acts of the Apostless of idea, or physical Acts of the Apostless of speech production or composing. These Acts of the Apostless of judgement are suited for set uping inter-subjectively valid cognition when translated into verbal or written looks. Protocol statements come to be regarded as certain phrases which are non meaningful. When we retrace the way by which we arrive at all our cognition, we ever come up once more the same beginning: centripetal experiences and through the sentiments of other people. On this position protocol statements would be existent occurrences in the universe and would temporally predate the other existent procedures in which the prod uction of an single # 8217 ; s cognition consists. He is non concerned who expressed the right position, but what the right position is. The two positions, that statements register simple informations of observation and stand temporally at the beginning could besides be those that by virtuousness of their construction would hold to represent the logical starting-point of scientific discipline. A.J. Ayer seeks in his article # 8220 ; Verification and Experience # 8221 ; to find the truth or falsity of empirical propositions. The customary reply is that it is their understanding or dissension with world. He draws a differentiation between # 8220 ; # 8230 ; those empirical propositions can be determined by determining the truth or falsity of other propositions, and those whose truth or falsity can be determined straight by observation. # 8221 ; ( 3 ) One can prove an single proposition by set uping the truth or falsity relating to the object of the statement. One may besides infer one cosmopolitan proposition from another, and deduce it by analogy, but one must get at a proposition for which the grounds consists entirely in the truth or falsity of certain remarkable propositions. No affair how many remarkable propositions are established, one is neer entitled to see the cosmopolitan proposition as once and for all verified. Nor does the falseness of one statement negate the cosmopolitan proposition. The logical dissymmetry in the relationship of universal and remarkable propositions that has led some philosophers to follow the possibility of disproof instead than that of confirmation as their standard of empirical significance. Ayer claims philosophers have reached propositions which need non wait upon other propositions for the finding of their truth or falsity, but are such that they can be straight confronted with the given facts. These are called basic propositions. The differentiation between them and other propositions is reasonably legitimate, # 8220 ; # 8230 ; so we may restrict ourselves to inquiries refering the nat ure of basic propositions and the mode in which our finding of their cogency depends upon our experience.† ( 4 ) The legitimacy of the differentiation between basic and other propositions is implicitly acknowledged by philosophers who reject the impression of understanding with world as a standard of truth. Propositions can merely be compared to each other, and can non be compared with world or experience. There is another position of basic propositions, a category of â€Å"protocol propositions.† For a sentence to show a protocol propositions it is necessary that it should incorporate the name or description of an perceiver and some words mentioning to an act of observation. The claims for this signifier have the advantage of giving protocol propositions greater stableness. One can do the truth and falsity of any proposition whatsoever depend upon its compatibility or mutual exclusiveness with other propositions. One frequently does non acknowledge other standard. In th is regard, protocol propositions are non allowed any advantage. A protocol proposition is non one which can be straight verified by observation, for one can deny that this is possible. Other philosophers use the term â€Å"protocol† strictly as a syntactical appellation for a certain gathering of words. â€Å"†¦One attaches such particular significance to the word observation because there is no mistake involved in building sentences of a curious type and ennobling them with the rubric of Protokollsaetze, but it is arbitrary and misleading.† ( 5 ) In other words, protocol propositions are non meaningful, but they are a footing for the foundation of cognition. The quest for cognition and certainty tantrums what we discussed with epistemology. Descartes portions the same desire for certainty in his life as do Ayer and Schlick. Kant # 8217 ; s concluding that all cognition comes into us through centripetal experience applies to Schlick # 8217 ; s ideas about protocol statements being finally determined by our experience and perceptual experience. The positions of Ayer and Schlick interact to a great extent. The protocol proposition is similar to the thought of the protocol statement, because a statement is most frequently non nonsubjective nor true. Both philosophers start from the same topographic point, which is to set up certainty in what they believe, such as Descartes did, and they arrive at the same decision, which is that meaningful address is polluted with sentiment and uncertainness, but that this is the manner in which worlds get their cognition. Descartes discusses the ways in which people get their perceptual experiences, thoug hts, and the # 8220 ; knowledge # 8221 ; they hold for true, which is through centripetal experience, and this is what Ayer and Schlick say. The two differ somewhat in the manner that Schlick bases all statements on conforming to the protocol statement, but Ayer takes a more nonsubjective attack when he discusses the differences between basic propositions and protocol propositions. Both philosophers recognise that protocol statements are based on a construction of words which are restricted in their use, and that they can non pass on an thought efficaciously. They besides both recognise that one may believe that they themselves are right in an thought but may really be false because they hold false perceptual experience. I believe that one may encompass a true thought, in world, one which people can non accept or rebut because they do non cognize it is world, and at the same clip this individual may believe a false thought. Everyone has something to lend, but one beginning is non plenty. I besides believe that truth and falseness is a valid differentiation when discoursing whole truths, but that the construct of good and bad exists in world on a graduated table which linguistic communication frequently causes us to bury, and that if we could spread out our vocabularies to encompass more than the # 8220 ; black and white # 8221 ; terminals of this spectrum, that we would understand this construct better. This would help epistemology because one could spot better between an thought that holds more cogency over a larger image than another, instead than presuming that by tax write-off, they are false and have nil to lend. By # 8220 ; run alonging up # 8221 ; the false propositions by grade, we could be better pointed toward truth. I agree with both philosophers, and with Descartes, that our perceptual experience is something we must look into on and invariably analyse, because necessarily, each of us will keep some truth and some falseness. Bibliography Hanfling, Oswald, Logical Positivism ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1981 ) , p. 24-71. ( I read this book and got some thoughts, but no quotation marks ) Ayer, A.J. ( editor ) , Logical Positivism ( Illinois: Free Press, 1959 ) , p. 209-227 ( Schlick ) , 228-243 ( Ayer ) . 1. Ayer, p. 210 2. Ayer, p. 212 3. Ayer, p. 229 4. Ayer, p. 231 5. Ayer, p. 232